Garl B. Latham : F.R.A., passenger, transit

The Cotton Belt: an addendum to the conundrum

Garl B. Latham — Fri, 27 Apr 2012 22:52:00 GMT

Mention the Cotton Belt Route in north central Texas and it brings to mind the St. Louis Southwestern Railway's former main traveling northeast out of Fort Worth's famed Stockyards, past the Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport, across Dallas' northern suburbs and into the "ArkLaTex" region. Dallas Area Rapid Transit owns the corridor from Tower 60 (North Fort Worth) to Wylie, at which point the line falls under state ownership by way of the Northeast Texas Rural Rail Transportation District (NETEX). The Blacklands Railroad, proclaimed "Short Line Railroad of the Year" in 2011 by the Railway Age, operates 73 miles of line from Greenville (about 29 miles east of Wylie) to Mount Pleasant and a junction with today's Union Pacific.

The existing DART-owned portion can be effectively divided into three segments: Fort Worth to the D/FW Airport and D/FW to Plano (with each stretch representing approximately two-fifths of the total distance), thence Plano to Wylie.

The trackage east of Plano to Wylie isn't currently a part of any specific public planning documents. In fact, it was during my tenure at DART that I learned a valuable (but distressing) truism concerning professional Planners: for all their talents, they aren't necessarily future-minded. To put it another way, they can occasionally be far too practical to allow themselves the luxury of dreaming. [That's not a bad thing, of course; occasionally, one needs level heads to prevail.] Still, it was a DART Planner who taught me what I came to call the "N" word and the "C" word: "never" and "can't."

"Wylie? Oh, we'll never go there. We can't do that."

This is despite the fact that NETEX specifically identified the purchase of their Wylie/Greenville right-of-way (the track infrastructure having been previously removed by the SSW) as being based upon its connection to the DART-owned portion of the corridor, which will enable "future rail passenger connections to/from the [Dallas/Fort Worth area]."

Hmmm. Don't they understand what never and can't mean?!

Oh, well.

We've previously discussed the former Cotton Belt Route within Dallas and the various issues which only serve to undermine attempts at the restoration of passenger service along that line. Now, in an effort to gain a more complete understanding of the matter, we'll shift our focus to Fort Worth.

Call this the west side story, if you will.

It's that western segment - Fort Worth to D/FW by way of Grapevine - which, at least in theory, holds the best chance for near-term development.

The Fort Worth Transportation Authority (known locally as "The T"...although, in deference to the MBTA, I just can't bring myself to use that moniker) has been working on this project in its current form for the past six years. Now, they're not only attempting to segue into the preliminary engineering phase, they're also trying to secure various avenues of funding for the 600 to 750 million dollar price tag (depending upon whom you ask and what all is included).

Certainly, there are the usual issues with NIMBYs. Some locals, failing to understand the promise of rail-based transit (or falling for the standard scare tactics) are gearing up for a protracted fight. The two most vocal areas are the City of Colleyville and the Mistletoe Heights neighbourhood in Fort Worth (which, interestingly, is not actually located along the original SSW main, but on a proposed former-SLSW line extension intended to serve the medical district).

Naturally, all the homeowners are asking is that their "legitimate concerns" be addressed. Concerns which have made their "legitimate" short list (how 'bout that qualifier?) include, of course, automobile traffic and noise, neighbourhood encroachment, and (wait for it...) property values!

I've done this sort of thing on a professional basis before, standing between virulent property owners on the one side and progress on the other, through some of the most difficult "new starts" territory we've yet to see in north central Texas. I bear the scars to prove it.

"Legitimate" concerns notwithstanding, what most the NIMBYs actually believe they want is for the bad ol' trains to just GO AWAY! Short of that, they'll hold out for additional landscaping and "visual mitigation" walls - substantial barriers which will not only block the station site from the homeowners, but also block the homeowners from the station site!

In one word, they are afraid.

The saddest thing? Presuming the antis get their way, folks living nearby who are blessed with a healthy dose of common sense will end up being deprived of a convenient way to and from the trains - and all the noise and "encroachment" will still exist, even if the trains don't stop at all!

The NIMBYs have precious little to do with my primary concerns, however.

To me, the distinct possibility that the project will be seriously hobbled from the outset is truly depressing. As we've already pointed out, due to the previously negotiated DART agreements, operations along any segment of the Cotton Belt may be required to use the so-called Light Rail New Technology (L.R.N.T.) vehicle (a.k.a. the North Texas Regional Rail Vehicle) - not yet developed, but presumably similar to Stadler's G.T.W. (something else we've discussed before). Might that be enough to shoot the project in the flange? Who knows? When a government agency mandates the use of specific technologies which have yet to be developed, strange things can happen. Ever hear of P.T.C.?!

There are no public discussions being held regarding through service, whatsoever. DART and the F.W.T.A. are busy planning within their respective vacuums - and if tomorrow's rider wishes to go from, say, Grapevine to Addison, they'll be required to physically change trains, probably within the airport grounds (adding a sizeable chunk of time). Worse yet, if I was a gambling man, I'd bet my bottom dollar there will be no true coordination between service schedules, whatsoever.

The hardest thing to take is the terminal situation within the D/FW Airport property, itself. Here in our "modern" society, airfield security has long been an established fact of life. It's now two completely different worlds on the secure and unsecure sides of a passenger terminal.

At D/FW, several individual terminals exist, all connected by the relative new Skylink "bus-in-a-gutter" people mover (which replaced the original Airtrans system). Unfortunately, Skylink is on the secure side of things. Once a passenger arrives at the airport by train and passes though security (requiring a valid ticket, don't you know), she can always use Skylink to reach any terminal desired. However, upon arrival at D/FW, her baggage will be claimed on the UNsecure side of things - instantly making Skylink inaccessible as a transfer agent and causing the train depot to be that much more difficult to reach.

Finally, there are ongoing issues with the entire series of Cotton Belt projects which clearly indicate the powers-that-be are willing to agree to almost anything in order to get their individual segments rolling.

Regarding the western stretch, what may prove most interesting revolves around preliminary negotiations with one of the three primary property owners.

There's no signed document with DART, yet; but, knowing the agency, I find it difficult to believe that will be a problem. President Gary Thomas is an honourable man and you can take one of his verbal promises to the bank. All that's left to hammer out are the details.

The Fort Worth and Western (owners of the ex-Frisco extension) is haggling over improvements (including signaling and stretches of second main) intended to effectively eliminate delays to their own traffic. Nothing mind-boggling there. The FWWR is only looking after their customer's (and investor's) best interests. I'd be shocked with (and extremely disappointed in) any road that did otherwise.

No; in this case, it's the UP who's doing the posturing. They've brought a completely unrelated matter into the discussion as a negotiating ploy. If nothing else, it'll be fascinating to see how it all plays out.

UP owns a couple of puzzle pieces: one which joins the Texas & Pacific Railway Building downtown to the FWWR main line west of that depot and the other running a couple of miles between interlocking plants at 6th Street (the Trinity Railway Express [nee Railtran] connection) and Tower 60 (the junction with DART).

The two parties currently stand in agreement that access to the T&P station will require a separate lead dedicated to passenger service. It's the other stretch which may prove to be a sticky wicket.

According to several sources, in exchange for capacity north of downtown to the Cotton Belt line, UP wants Amtrak (Amtrak?) to operate their existing service between Fort Worth and Dallas (AMTK 21 and 22) over the T.R.E. route instead of the former T&P.

The T.R.E. alignment between the two cities - already heavily used by commuter trains - may indeed be a reasonable choice for today's Texas Eagle, but it is not for a myriad number of other future trains (such as, for example, a Galveston/Houston/Dallas/Fort Worth/Oklahoma City service - one possibility which isn't too far-fetched).

Once you remove the only scheduled passenger service from the T&P, you've effectively redefined that corridor as "freight only." This will dramatically increase future costs when any sort of passenger service is restored.

Personally, I see a LOT of potential downsides for the T.R.E. in signing a deal with Amtrak, including daily operations, Amtrak's presumed superiority over all other services, the distinct possibility that Amtrak trains will be late as often as not (which may eventually cause a reduction in the number of overhead trains the T.R.E. can handle on a given day, directly affecting UP and BNSF movements over that line - the T.R.E.'s bread-and-butter), various mechanical matters, Amtrak's ostensible desire to use the CentrePort station for airport connections (or at least some other group's desires that Amtrak do so), liability issues and so forth.

In all fairness, I must mention the two best reasons to support the Texas Eagle's operation over the T.R.E. (and, for that matter, any other Dallas/Austin/San Antonio service): no reverse moves involved to reach the Fort Worth station (in this case, the regrettably named Intermodal Transportation Center, or I.T.C.) and only one trip through Tower 55 per train instead of three. In addition, there's something to be said for setting a precedent whereby the T.R.E. becomes the "official" passenger railway corridor connecting Dallas and Fort Worth, firmly establishing that line's right to claim any future intercity improvement capital allocated by the feds.

To be honest, I just find it regrettable that so many other players claim the right to make plans involving Amtrak and the T.R.E. Of course, government agents have been doing that to the Class Is for years, so I should be used to it by now. Even BNSF has involved the T.R.E. when publicly outlining their hopes for solutions to congestion at Tower 55, so UP certainly has company.

I figure UP's stance may also have something (a whole bunch of things?) to do with local planning efforts regarding future commuter traffic on that same T&P line through Grand Prairie and Arlington. For the record: the North Central Texas Council of Governments has already promised UP that construction of a third main line track will be part of any "regional rail" bargain, even though improvements to Tower 55 and an expansion of Davidson Yard would do far more toward keeping that corridor fluid.

We'll see.

I must admit, when things get this interesting, they are rarely dull!

The Cotton Belt conundrum

Garl B. Latham — Fri, 30 Mar 2012 21:39:00 GMT

I really hate this.

I can count on one hand with fingers left over the number of times this has ever happened to me: a passenger service initiative which I'm not only unable to support, but find myself actively opposing. Worse yet, it's a proposal that honestly looks good - at least as a line drawn on a map.

I also hate it that knowledgeable planners have inadvertently worked with unknowledgeable elected officials, effectively placing me in this position.

The Transportation Department of the North Central Texas Council of Governments, under the direction of Michael Morris, is universally respected. It has earned that respect. Regrettably, its primary goal regarding this proposal has nothing to do with the movement of people.

Instead, it's an experiment designed to see if a new type of financing arrangement might be cobbled together which would provide the money necessary to construct and - are you ready? - operate regularly scheduled passenger train service.

Their plan is called the "Innovative Finance Initiative" (or "iFi" for short - presumably pronounced "eye-fie." Cute, huh?).

In quick summation, the basic idea is to incorporate "value capture methods" into the government sponsored rail-based transit/regional passenger service world. The "iFi" concept involves transferring a portion of the revenue obtained from real estate/transit-oriented development along a service corridor back to the operators of the transportation line, itself.

And why not? After all, T.O.D. is a proven methodology for the effective use of properties adjacent to a new transit line, especially the areas around stations. Why shouldn't a public transportation agency or a railroad (or some other private company) stand to benefit from the increased commercial value, since it was the proximity to trains which caused the increase? There are many historical examples where such a scheme has worked well for our industry. Combine the logic of T.O.D. with other sustainable development patterns and we may have a winning formula.

Sadly, however, major compromises in the planning and design of the railway line itself have been made, simply in an effort to get this specific project to the point where the "iFi" concept can be implemented.

The route of which I speak is the Cotton Belt corridor, basically designed to tie the Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport directly to downtown Fort Worth and Dallas' northern suburbs.

Named for the line's former owner (Espee's St. Louis Southwestern Railway), the route is not necessarily the next logical step in restoring rail-based passenger transport to the region. Other lines-on-a-map could also make the grade and offer far more transit benefits. Moreover, adequate plans were never made for connecting services to interface with the route. The junction point with DART's Green Line in downtown Carrollton is bad enough; the plan for Red Line interface in Plano is ridiculous.

The equipment of choice (perhaps I should say "by law") has remained a real thorn in my side. One of the reasons I wrote Oh, to be compliant was because of the rolling stock being touted for this service:

"DART has committed itself (and anyone else wanting to play) to use...passenger equipment...which will combine some of the least desirable characteristics of light rail technology (size, comfort and cost among them) with some of the least desirable characteristics of commuter train technology (weight, flexibility and motive power among them). Their stated wish is to develop, as part of the combined project, an F.R.A.-compliant hybrid, to be called the 'North Texas Regional Rail Vehicle' (a.k.a. 'L.R.N.T.' or 'Light Rail New Technology')."

http://myprogressiverailroading.com/blogs/gblatham/archive/2011/01/12/oh-to-be-compliant.aspx

The closest thing on the market today is Stadler's Gelenktriebwagen (or G.T.W. for short), which is not fully compliant with existing F.R.A. regulations. Even with route-specific wavers in place, we're still not discussing a car which can ever be "a one-size-fits-all, go-anywhere/do-anything self-propelled railroad passenger vehicle, able to 'cross all track barriers: commuter, freight, and light-rail' (according to one of the local documents)."

We've discussed this before. "What DART will probably end up with is a new vehicle which, by definition, will be far more costly to build and far less comfortable to ride than its conventional commuter train counterparts, unsuited for long trips...and, due to its unique nature, difficult and expensive to maintain."

So, why would such a decision regarding equipment (or any other decisions, for that matter) have been made prior to the completion of preliminary engineering work?

In a word, ladies and gentlemen, it's politics. Surprised?

Everything we see regarding the planning and execution of passenger service along the eastern half of the Cotton Belt is happening with but one thing in mind: keeping a few home owners in far north Dallas placated.

The City of Dallas (and, in a sense, DART) has basically committed itself to a bad plan in an effort to gain tacit support of various residents along the corridor. For years, City Council members representing the most vocal district have been elected, in part, on the basis of how they stood regarding this singular issue...from Sandy Greyson to Ron Natinsky, author of the so-called "Natinsky Plan".

According to Natinsky, locals have been primarily concerned with "vehicle technology, design and corridor safety" (which is very interesting, since all I ever remember hearing them scream about was their "property values"). You know, it makes me wonder: If these folks think trains are such a bad thing, why did they purchase houses next to a railroad track in the first place? Of course, I've had some look me right in the eye and seriously claim they never knew traffic levels might increase! Even if that's the unvarnished truth, why should this entire region suffer because these home buyers never heard of "due diligence"?!

Specific aspects of the Natinsky Plan - a 2006 resolution to which both the City and DART agreed - include the absolute elimination of common carrier freight operations within the district in question (and, therefore, all through service), limiting the route to a single main line (regardless of operational requirements) and placing the trackage inside a long trench (which just happens to be in a 100-year flood plain).

With me so far?

Okay, then. Let's get back to our original topic: fancy financing.

It all started with a seven-digit-figure study, naturally.

I say "naturally" because almost nothing is done in the domestic railroad passenger transportation world today with out a study or two (or three or four). These studies are often not for something substantive (like project engineering) but something far more nebulous (like project "feasibility").

Well, here's a truism, free of charge: throw enough money at a project and it'll magically become "feasible."

Unfortunately, money usually isn't available to simply throw around. In fact, as we've already discussed, with the Cotton Belt project, the entire study deals with ways to secure the necessary financing. Feasibility is presumed (although it shouldn't be).

So, how does one entice private firms to invest in an industry segment which, overall, hasn't made much profit (if any) for at least the past 85 years? That's a fair question, too. After all, passenger train services tend to lose money: individually or as a group, by route or system, from local transit to intercity express, they lose money. Worse yet, in the short-haul world, the more people who're willing to ride and the more trains that are operated, the larger the deficits incurred. The financials remind me of the Penn Central school of economics: we may lose money on every car load, but we'll make up for it in volume.

In fact, a private company could be given the needed infrastructure, along with brand-new equipment and beautifully designed station facilities - with a guaranteed source of "free" cash to maintain the lot - and that company would still walk away from the deal, since passenger fares would not even begin to cover operations.

It gets worse.

For the past couple of years, Peter M. Rogoff of the Federal Transit Administration has been trying to tell Cotton Belt route proponents (and anyone else who'd listen) that simply emulating the toll road industry by encouraging private investment in railway passenger service is a financial dead end. Whether it's the (deserved) reputation of passenger trains as loss leaders or the U.S.' recessionary climate (or both), most private firms have lost interest in the concept of doing for trains what they've done for automobiles.

When asked for details, Rogoff explained that the "F.T.A. has had a mixed experience with public-private partnerships." Risk transfer, crucial to almost all turnpike deals, is notably impotent in many rail-based proposals. His agency has noticed that "the private entity wants to take on little to no risk and take something off the top, when the public sector and the transit agencies still bear the vast majority of the risk of cost overruns or the risk of ridership not materializing as envisioned."

In the rare instances where private firms might indicate a willingness to accept up-front risk in passenger schemes, Rogoff believes transit agencies must structure agreements with great care. "You have to have hard guarantees as to frequency of service and reliability of service and have to be able to really not just finance the project but also require ... [the private firm] to operate the project for a real period of time," he said. "Then you need to hold that partnership accountable for delivering."

But why would any private operator want to be "accountable for delivering" when they have no say-so in how a given project is designed and precious little input in the way it's built?

Ay, there’s the rub.

The Cotton Belt route's biggest flaw - its fatal flaw - has nothing to do with that single line on the map or what it represents. It's not how our local Metropolitan Planning Organisation is attempting to find alternative means of financing. It's not any of the usual vacuous arguments against mass transit (especially the rail-based kind).

No; as it now stands, the Cotton Belt service proposal is doomed to failure because it's been designed by politicians for political purposes.

Period.

For a long time, I looked at this proposal from both a passenger's and railroader's perspective. In doing so, I completely lost track of reality. The Cotton Belt project exists as a political animal, designed to generate jobs and score points. If it actually serves the train riding public, so much the better; but, that's not what it's ultimately designed to do.

During my tenure at DART, I was blessed with two wonderful superiors: my boss and his boss. It was my boss' boss who occasionally reminded me how applying logic to agency matters could be a very dangerous thing.

While considering the realities of the Cotton Belt proposal, I forgot to also consider his wisdom.

I forgot that DART's Public-Private Partnership (3P) agreement stipulates the service should maintain "the same type of vehicle and operating characteristics on the entire corridor" (including Fort Worth Transit Authority's proposed downtown to D/FW International Airport "TEXRail" service) and that DART's resolution can (and probably will) force all DART-owned segments of the Cotton Belt to use the new LRNT vehicle (however that ends up being defined) - even though DART has previously stated that the operational "conditions [which caused the need for their LRNT vehicle in first place] are currently specific only to the north Dallas section of the corridor between Addison and the Red Line."

I forgot that a major driving force behind the development of a North Texas Regional Rail Vehicle is the prospect that the builder of the winning design will set up a manufacturing plant in this area, with the transit agencies and the R.T.C. dutifully requiring all future lines to use the new product. [Anyone who has seen a real commuter railroad at work, like Metro North or Metra or Caltrain - forget about it!] We should just remain thankful that the Trinity Railway Express is already in operation! [Suddenly, the corridor's preliminary estimate of 6,000 riders per day through far north Dallas makes a lot more sense!]

I forgot that the project stands to be quite entertaining, in a macabre sort of way. The possibility rail fares will be high and parking will cost money and the "private" side of the project will demand a PROFIT (the fourth "P"!) all lends itself to a major-class spectacle - especially once reality sets in and the operator(s) realise(s) the United States still doesn't have a national transportation policy in place and that the feds will still be competing against passenger train service through all their direct and indirect subsidies toward roadways. Profits will be privatised and losses will be socialised and we'll end up holding the bag.

It all makes for quite a conundrum; even some sort of Gordian Knot. Unfortunately, this one will not be solved by simply applying outside-the-box thinking (a la Alexander's sword), since it has been outrageously ineffective and potentially disastrous outside-the-box thinking which has brought us to this point in the first place!

Yes, I forgot...but it's all coming back to me, now!

And I really hate this.

Don Phillips, Barack Obama and personal vindication

Garl B. Latham — Tue, 17 Jan 2012 22:53:00 GMT

During the late 1980s, as Union Pacific began to merge former Missouri-Kansas-Texas Railroad operations into its growing system, I became concerned about the future of a little used ex-Katy main line in north central Texas. The route in question stretched from B-RI Jct. in the city of Waxahachie to Dana Jct. just north of Hillsboro, basically completing the Dallas (eastern) side of the Katy's primary Kansas City - San Antonio corridor.

Historically, the Katy sent most of their north/south freight traffic through Fort Worth, leaving the alternate route by way of Big D available for passengers...which also left it quite vulnerable, once such trade evaporated.

UP, naturally, saw no reason to maintain both lines and, once the marriage was consummated, quickly moved to "rationalise" its plant.

Thanks to BNSF and Rail America's Dallas, Garland and Northeastern, most of the Dallas side was saved (with certain portions, thanks to DART, reclaimed for alternative rail-based uses). However, sans overhead traffic, that bucolic 35-mile stretch across the blackland prairie between Ellis County and Hill County was found good for little and profitable for nothing.

Nothing, that is, except the future.

According to several studies, the single most viable intrastate passenger operation in Texas would be the corridor between Dallas and San Antonio via Waco and Austin.

There are many reasons why that line's potential has yet to be tapped. One is a classically circuitous routing, including the fact that trains leaving Dallas must first head west to Fort Worth before turning south. Regrettably, the only way to operate directly from Dallas to Waco (and points beyond) is by way of the now-abandoned Katy.

Over a span of years, I tried, in vain, to get SOMEONE's attention and support (the Texas D.O.T., the North Central Texas Council of Governments, somebody) for the purchase of that route. In the meantime, various pieces dried up and fell along the wayside. UP applied to abandon the final four-and-one-half mile long segment, stretching from Waxahachie to the community of Nena, early in this century.

That exhaustive and convoluted introduction is important because of what happened a couple of years ago. At a conference, I saw a friend and key passenger train service advocate (and past president of the Texas Association of Railroad Passengers) who, in passing, mentioned how he had finally come to agree with me about the vital nature of that trackage.

It should have been saved. A government agency needed to step up and make a commitment. More productive activity among those who cared could have changed the outcome.

Yeah; I was right all along.

And that, along with four bucks and change, will buy my occasional cafe latte from Starbucks.

I wish his admission had made me feel better. Instead, it made me sick - down to my very soul.

Not because of his feelings, per se. He was only being honest and certainly meant no harm.

No, it was because of what could have been. Amtrak had been in existence for almost 19 years before the UP took ownership of that route, and another one score years passed before the rails were finally removed. If short- to medium-distance corridors truly represent the primary future of intercity passenger train service in these United States, why did this irrevocable loss occur?!

Unfortunately, this is by no means the only (or even the best) example of an instance where I fussed and pestered and wrote and preached and was later - TOO LATE - shown to be "right all along."

Maybe God is just trying to teach me some humility...or encourage the practice of perseverance in the face of intractability. Perhaps a far greater trial awaits me tomorrow, where yesterday's lessons learned will finally prove indispensable.

All of this came to mind as I was leafing through the latest issue of Trains Magazine. Don Phillips, a reporter for the International Herald Tribune (and former transportation writer for The Washington Post), maintains a monthly column which, for me, has always been a must-read. His February essay, entitled Obama hasn't matched language with action, details several reasons why the current administration's apparent goals for improved/expanded passenger service have generally remained unrealised.

He has much to say, not much of it complementary.

"'High Speed Rail' was a slogan that never lived up to its billing, and may have harmed rail initiatives."

"...the term 'high speed rail' has turned on Obama."

"...even the billions appropriated for high speed rail are obviously a puny amount, and that is becoming clear to everyone."

"...Obama no longer has the political power to keep the money flowing."

"...OBAMA HAS NEVER DEFINED 'HIGH SPEED RAIL'." [emphasis mine]

"...Amtrak's current system continues to rot."

"Is it any wonder that the term 'high speed rail' has turned from a phrase of hope to a phrase of derision?"

"What should Obama have said? ...[he should] have come into office...stressing that WE MUST WALK BEFORE WE CAN RUN." [emphasis mine]

Progressive Railroading magazine, through its web site, gave me an outlet I never had before, allowing me to address these matters (and more) well prior to the publication of Mr. Phillips' report. Columns like Obama Speed Rail, High Speed Rail is not the starting point and The myth of "Higher Speed Rail" reviewed the foundational problems with the current administration's transportation endeavours and offered possible alternatives. The compositions were well received by our group and the critical feedback universally constructive.

I feel somewhat vindicated by what Don Phillips has to say. I'm glad a man with a well-established reputation is finally calling Mr. Obama and his transportation appointees to task, both for their missteps and their abject failures.

I, too, want to believe I'm right; not because of who I am, but because of what my logical mind indicates is true.

I trust this will encourage me to continue writing, even in the face of intrenched opposition. I should never stay away very long from those who, like me, understand the industry, the technology, the issues at hand and the importance of these things to our world.

My sincere best wishes to all.

Oh, to be compliant

Garl B. Latham — Wed, 12 Jan 2011 00:17:00 GMT

It may simply be a sign of getting old, I suppose. One believes he knows and understands certain concepts, only to discover that some of the rules have changed whilst he slept (metaphorically, of course).

In the 45 years that the F.R.A. has been in existence (yes...that's forty five years!), they've been fairly straightforward concerning the issue of equipment safety compliance. In fact, from my perspective, it's always seemed to be the epitome of simplicity: either a locomotive or piece of rolling stock was F.R.A. compliant (i.e., suitable for use on general system trackage) or it wasn't. 49 C.F.R. Part 238 may not make for great bedtime reading, but it leaves little room for quibbling.

Over here are the passenger cars that may run along side double stack container trains and high cube box cars. They are compliant. Over there are the various rail-based transit vehicles: L.R.V.s, streetcars and certain D.M.U.s (mostly of European design), which canNOT be used on general system trackage - at least without temporal separation, operational waivers and the like. They are NON-compliant.

To use a Biblical analogy, we're separating the sheep from the goats.

Ah, but nothing can be left alone, it seems - especially when politicians and attorneys are present. [At least there are many competent Professional Engineers at the F.R.A. to help keep things on an even keel.]

Surely, the need to readdress the F.R.A.'s approach to safety has often been discussed. While other modes (and most other continent's railway systems) are content to design their safety practices around the concept of incident avoidance, our own F.R.A. still dwells on incident survivability. The presumption is that derailments are inevitable and crashes unavoidable; therefore, in response, weight is added to the system by way of heftier rolling stock. This leads to train sets like Amtrak's Acela: a sort of Shinkansen on steroids.

Far be it from me to question what might happen if an Acela consist became entangled with a conventional E.M.U.-equipped train during a cornfield meet.

An aside: In this context, it's sort of profound to consider railroad/highway grade crossings and the weight differentials there. After all, Operation Lifesaver has oft' compared the results of a train/motor vehicle collision to an automobile running over a Dr Pepper can.

[Off the property, there are also plenty of sports cars sharing roadways with tractor/trailer rigs.]

No matter. This is all being driven by Washington and its desire to expedite the re-creation of railway passenger services on a strict budget.

To quote from the F.R.A.'s own work, "the proliferation of planned passenger rail systems around the country" is going to cause "more States and operating authorities...to use passenger equipment designed to alternative standards, which have been proven in foreign operating conditions but not under the more severe conditions encountered in the United States."

Now, once upon a time, "the proliferation of...passenger rail systems around the country" was taken in stride.

Interurban railways interchanged traffic with steam roads. Motors would pick up and deliver box cars and reefers at junctions for local, on line customers, sharing the route with interurbans which, in turn, safely carried passengers to and from city, hamlet and farm. When in town, those same interurban cars would often freely use trackage of local street railway lines - which fielded much smaller (though similar) equipment. In fact, many major cities (including Dallas) had interurban terminals which were owned and operated by the streetcar company.

All of this sharing and commingling with nary a complaint and rarely a fatality.

Oh, well. That was then, this is now, and Alternative Compliance is the name of the game.

Back here in (and near) Big D, there are two regional passenger services which are being championed by Dallas Area Rapid Transit, the Fort Worth Transportation Authority, and the North Central Texas Council of Governments. Both will use segments of the former Cotton Belt main heading east/northeast out of Fort Worth (owned by DART between Tower 60 [North Fort Worth] and Wylie).

DART has committed itself (and anyone else wanting to play) to use an as yet unavailable type of passenger equipment, which will combine some of the least desirable characteristics of light rail technology (size, comfort and cost among them) with some of the least desirable characteristics of commuter train technology (weight, flexibility and motive power among them). Their stated wish is to develop, as part of the combined project, an F.R.A.-compliant hybrid, to be called the "North Texas Regional Rail Vehicle" (a.k.a. "L.R.N.T." or "Light Rail New Technology").

To me, the main problem is pretty obvious: what DART is publicly searching for does not now - and I'm willing to bet will never - exist: a one-size-fits-all, go-anywhere/do-anything self-propelled railroad passenger vehicle, able to "cross all track barriers: commuter, freight, and light-rail" (according to one of the local documents).

What DART will probably end up with is a new vehicle which, by definition, will be far more costly to build and far less comfortable to ride than its conventional commuter train counterparts, unsuited for long trips (like Fort Worth to Plano) and, due to its unique nature, difficult and expensive to maintain.

Worst of all? In the process of reinventing the wheel, the feds, along with several public agencies (including the three I mentioned), are now inadvertently creating a completely new sphere of operations: a railway service under the jurisdiction of the F.R.A. which, due to its equipment, will remain forever incompatable with most general system traffic, yet will never be allowed to use F.T.A.-governed transit lines. It's not compliant, yet it's not completely NON-compliant. It exists in some sort of Neverland. Unlike Peter Pan, though, it is all too real.

For a long time, I've looked at proposals like this from both a passenger's and railroader's perspective. In doing so, I have completely lost track of reality! You see, many of these projects exist as political animals, designed to generate jobs and score points. If they actually end up serving the train riding public, so much the better; but, that's not what they're ultimately designed to do.

DART's Public-Private Partnership agreement for the Cotton Belt stipulates the service should maintain "the same type of vehicle and operating characteristics on the entire corridor." That being the case, DART can (and probably will) force all DART-owned segments of the Cotton Belt to adopt the L.R.N.T. vehicle (however that ends up being defined) - even though DART has previously stated that the operational "conditions [which caused the need for their L.R.N.T. vehicle in first place] are currently specific only to the north Dallas section of the corridor between Addison and the Red Line."

A major driving force behind the development of a North Texas Regional Rail Vehicle is the prospect that the builder of the winning design will set up a manufacturing plant in this area, with the transit agencies and the Regional Transportation Council (a division of our local COG) dutifully insisting that all future lines use the new product. [Anyone who has seen a real commuter railroad at work, like Metro North or Metra or Caltrain - FORGET about it!] We should just remain thankful the Trinity Railway Express is already in operation.

Politics may play a major role - perhaps the major role - in today's passenger transport world, but why must its involvement so often result in an inferior product?

Maybe I'll just go back to sleep.

High Speed Rail is not the starting point

Garl B. Latham — Wed, 30 Jun 2010 12:32:00 GMT

From birth, Amtrak has had more than its share of problems. I've always believed its biggest was a route network whose size falls far short of critical mass. "You can't get there from here" - even in the northeastern U.S. (outside of the much vaunted N.E.C.) - remains a true, if shopworn, cliche.

Therefore, when well meaning people begin preaching the benefits of High Speed Rail, I simply consider the source. "Poor misguided souls," I think, clucking my tongue.

But, when a bad idea becomes so prevalent and supporting proposals so numerous that general acceptance follows - "Oh, everybody knows that!" - it can only be ignored at one's peril.

Of course, here in these United States, we're creating an even bigger mess by touting the concept of "HighER Speed Rail" and pretending that "incrementalism" means improvements to specific steam road corridors can eventually, over time, deliver true H.S.R. service.

This is all so fatally flawed, on so many different levels, that it's difficult to know where to begin a rebuttal!

Perhaps, as a starting point, it's time for us to define "high-speed rail" once and for all.

Although U.S. politicians tend to have a field day with this issue, gleefully making things up as they go along, we can reach a reasonable conclusion.

I realise Transportation Secretary Ray LaHood has said "there is no definition of high-speed rail" (during a speech at Northwestern University in Evanston, Illinois) and that many might argue his statement is true - at least in the regions under his purview. Still, he was referencing international technologies at the time, which made his comment unjustifiable.

It is far better to rely upon David Briginshaw, Editor-in-Chief of the International Railway Journal (as quoted in the August, '09 issue of Railway Age) for a definition: "What exactly do we mean by high speed rail? The baseline is normally regarded as 125 miles-per-hour."

Please note that Mr. Briginshaw translated his lower speed threshold from Metric to English measurements in order to reduce potential confusion!

Now, is that 125 m/h figure reasonable in the U.S., given current standards?

Well, C.F.R. 49 defines transition from Tier I to Tier II equipment standards as occurring at 125 m/h.

The point at which the F.R.A. begins absolutely prohibiting all grade crossings under any circumstances is at Class 8 track. Class 7 trackage ends at 125 miles-per-hour.

The International Union of Railways defines H.S.R. "on existing trackage" as starting at 125 m/h (literally at 200 km/h). [H.S.R. on new, dedicated infrastructure begins at 250 km/h.] Members of the U.I.C. include Amtrak, the A.A.R., and the U.S. D.O.T.'s own F.R.A.!

Question: why wouldn't the F.R.A. accept the official definition of H.S.R. as adopted by an organisation of which they are a member? The only logical reason is politics, which is no basis for a technical definition!

Secretary LaHood may possess various reasons why it's in the administration's best interest to play games with semantics. That's his (and his boss') business. But, for the sake of consistency and preciseness, it is unreasonable to embrace any minimum speed figure of less than 125 miles-per-hour for true H.S.R.!

So, can any one of us confidently state that the political will necessary to accomplish the design, construction, operation and maintenance of a true U.S. high-speed network now exists? I find it doubtful. Surely, as has been the case for two generations, it's likely that a "high-speed or nothing" approach will give us precisely that: nothing!

Even if such a thing was politically tenable, I don't believe the best way to allocate limited capital resources for an improved/expanded North American passenger train network is through the establishment of true high speed railway services. The idea of U.S. H.S.R. is dramatically overplayed and, although I have no doubt it would be successful, spending even the smallest amount of funds toward dedicated, passenger-only rights-of-way and infrastructure without FIRST creating a comprehensive domestic transportation/energy/environmental policy is sheer folly!

Naturally, some will say that, even without existing political support or national policy in place, H.S.R. should remain a long-term goal, helping to generate jobs and restore the country's morale. I'm not prepared to argue the case one way or the other (although I'd always prefer that ANY transportation project stand upon its own merits). Still, before we embrace the H.S.R. concept, we should accept the various intermediate steps necessary to make high-speed projects work.

First and foremost, we must realise that there is not a single location in the world where true high-speed train transportation has been developed prior to the buildout and maximisation of its conventional railway network. Not one! In order for H.S.R. to be successful, passengers must have access to local transit, commuter and regional services, and a healthy intercity system, so their trips may be completed in an efficient and timely fashion.

Many people are preaching some sort of 21st century passenger "intermodalism," where the primary purpose of H.S.R. would be to serve short- to medium-haul markets formerly covered by commercial airlines. After all, there are many examples worldwide where high-speed trains have overtaken airlines in such markets - Amtrak's N.E.C. being among them. The British government has recently gone so far as to make that a national policy goal: the formal replacement of all short-haul domestic airline services with true H.S.R.!

Here in America, considering the complete absence of a national policy, that will be quite difficult. [Anyone care to find an elected official who'd be willing to suggest it?!] Besides, even if we did take that approach to intermodalism, it would place our new passenger train services in a ridiculously inferior position. Intermodalism has worked in the freight world because, without coercion, several relatively healthy modes joined forces and, recognising each others strengths and weaknesses, pooled their resources to make it happen. Conversely, in the domestic passenger world, trains are the lowly, unwanted stepchild. If we begin making our H.S.R. investments by concentrating upon the needs of the commercial airline industry, serving only end-point markets and creating little "planes-on-the-ground," that's all we'll ever have!

H.S.R. would end up exclusively operating to and from existing airfields, totally eschewing central city depots. This would eventually force railroad passengers, due to the location of their trains' station facilities, to be subjected to all the "security" requirements of their airline-based cousins.

I suppose all of this makes sense (in some weird and twisted way) to many members of a drive-or-fly society; however, by taking this approach, we're completely ignoring the need to address the United States' auto-centrism: the unhealthy and ultimately unsustainable over-dependence upon motor vehicle transportation.

True H.S.R. will end up competing with airways, not highways! High-speed railway networks will not offer any real alternative to the family car which is not already available by air. H.S.R. will not improve intra- and inter-urban rail-based transport; rather, the construction and operation of high-speed trains could easily consume all available capital, making even the smallest investments in other rail-based initiatives - things that are not very "sexy," but extremely vital in the scheme of things - even harder to come by.

A dedicated high-speed network of passenger trains would do absolutely NOTHING to improve service to the vast majority of destinations currently (or potentially) available to railroad travelers. In fact, it would not directly benefit existing railroad properties, whatsoever; therefore, by definition, it would do nothing to increase U.S. freight handling capacity - something which is far more important to the national economy. Any publicly funded improvements to railroad freight service would end up being a separate budget item derived from a separate set of plans and come to fruition through a completely separate infrastructure, increasing the cost to taxpayers and (presumably) making the entire programme politically unsupportable.

Without shared infrastructure, future-minded plans such as the electrification of railway main lines would be that much harder to accomplish and, in a way, even more difficult to justify, at least in the near term.

My point is not that U.S. H.S.R. should never happen. I've seen all the ill founded, unlearned arguments against it. None of them will stand against facts!

The lack of density is supposedly a serious drawback - until one realises that high-speed trains traverse a great deal of open countryside, overseas. Some will wail, "we can't afford it!" - but will seemingly support anything in their attempts to uphold auto-mobility. Others enthusiastically remind us that "the United states isn't Europe" - even though most current projects are state-centred and many U.S. states are comparable in size to European countries. [Of course, that's not what many people mean when they say we're "not Europe," as if human nature isn't a universal constant, or the way we spend our tax money is inherently superior to the way they spend theirs!]

"Government boondoggle" is a typical refrain, requiring a leap of faith to hurdle. Yet, since faith is ultimately based upon evidence (Hebrews 11:1), we gain assurance by seeing the myriad success stories, worldwide.

No, the question isn't if H.S.R. should have a role in U.S. society, but when. One learns to walk before he can run!

People are actively looking for alternatives TODAY! The sort of improvements which can be achieved through serious investment in our domestic railroad system can bear fruit in a relatively short period of time, and can prove to the skeptic that U.S. citizens will not only be willing to ride trains when gasoline is costly and traffic horrific, but will choose to ride trains simply because they're efficient, relaxing and fun!

The use of railroad technologies as political pawns may be predictable, but that doesn't make it justifiable. The longer it's allowed to continue unchecked, the longer we'll be forced to wait before any substantive improvements are made regarding U.S. passenger train service.

Certainly, High Speed Rail has its place; but, it CANNOT be our starting point!